This paper analyzes the optimal monetary policy in a two-country DSGE model with producer currency pricing and financial frictions. We show that if credit markets do not work perfectly, strict PPI targeting is excessively procyclical in response to positive productivity shocks. The related welfare losses are non-negligible, especially if financial imperfections interact with such frictions as nontradable production and wage stickiness. Foreign currency debt denomination affects the optimal monetary policy: it should be less contractionary in response to favourable domestic productivity disturbances and more so if productivity shocks originate abroad. We also find that central banks should allow for deviations from price stability to offset the effects of balance sheet shocks. While financial frictions substantially decrease attractiveness of all price targeting regimes, they do not have a significant effect on the performance of a monetary union agreement. Finally, nominal wage targeting is found to be fairly robust also in the presence of credit frictions.
Introduction
The New Keynesian model, which can be considered as a workhorse model for modern monetary policy analysis, assumes that financial markets work perfectly and so the interest rate set by central banks uniquely determines the cost of credit for borrowers. The recent financial crisis has exposed the lack of realism of this simplifying assumption and revived interest in business cycle models with financial frictions. Due to the path-breaking contributions from the 1990s, of which the most frequently cited are Bernanke et al. (1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , the quantitative framework was already at hand. What needed to be done was a normative analysis of how financial frictions affect the optimal monetary policy.
A number of recent papers have addressed this issue in a closed economy setup. For instance, Curdia and Woodford (2008) extend the basic New Keynesian monetary model to allow for a spread between interest rates faced by savers and borrowers. They demonstrate that if spreads are purely exogenous, the optimal policy conduct does not differ substantially from the frictionless case. Allowing for endogenous spreads (in an ad hoc way, i.e. by making them dependent on borrowers' debt) affects this conclusion only modestly. In particular, complete price stabilization is still very close to the optimal policy. Furthermore, adjusting the intercept in the Taylor rule by changes in credit spreads improves upon an unadjusted rule.
A more structural contribution is offered by Carlstrom et al. (2009) , who incorporate agency costs into a standard New Keynesian model. Since agency costs manifest themselves as endogenous mark-up shocks, maintaining price stability is not optimal in response to productivity shocks. However, it is very close to optimal even if agency costs are quite severe. A similar conclusion is reached by Demirel (2009) and De Fiore et al. (2009) , who introduce costly state verification into a model with a direct credit channel a'la Ravenna and Walsh (2006) , in which firms need to borrow in advance to finance production.
Overall, this line of the literature suggests that if financial markets do not work perfectly, the central bank has an incentive to depart from full price stability in response to productivity shocks. However, the marginal welfare gain of neutralizing the credit friction distortion is rather low, so strict inflation targeting is not far from optimal.
While the big advantage of the literature surveyed above is that it offers an analytical characterization of the results, its focus is on models that are very simple. They abstract from endogenous capital formation, which may have nontrivial consequences, given that financial frictions are considered to be particularly relevant for investment decisions. Also, they do not address open economy issues and other potentially important frictions. On the other hand, there is a number of papers incorporating financial frictions into a more sophisticated framework, but not discussing what the optimal policy should do. Instead, they offer welfare-based comparisons of alternative simple policy regimes.
For instance, building on Faia and Monacelli (2007) , Faia (2008) considers a general class of Taylor rules, with strict inflation and exchange rate targeting as extremes, in a two-country sticky price model with financial accelerator as in Bernanke et al. (1999) . Using the welfare rankings that ignore the effect of volatilities on mean welfare, she finds that the presence of credit frictions strengthens the case for floating exchange rate regimes in economies facing external shocks.
A related line of papers consider a small open economy model with a similar financial frictions block and foreign denomination of debt. Gertler et al. (2007) find that a fixed exchange regime exacerbates the contraction caused by an adverse risk premium shock. According to Devereux et al. (2006) , financial frictions magnify volatility but do not affect the ranking of alternative policy rules. Finally, Elekdag and Tchakarov (2007) show that at a certain level of leverage the peg starts to dominate the float if shocks originate abroad.
The aim of this paper is to fill the gaps in the literature by providing a qualitative and quantitative characterization of the optimal monetary policy conduct in an open economy facing financial frictions. To this end, we consider a medium-size two-country New Keynesian DSGE model with producer currency pricing, augmented by the financial accelerator mechanism. Having defined the optimal policy as a Ramsey cooperative equilibrium, we show how it is affected by fixing the exchange rate and how its outcomes deviate from those obtained for a set of standard simple targeting rules. Contrary to the existing literature, focusing on very simple models, we discuss how financial market imperfections interact with such frictions as the presence of nontradable goods and wage stickiness. We argue that a more complex model is a necessary step forward as the policy implications are sensitive to the types of frictions and, though to lesser extent, to the type of shocks. At the same time, to build intuition for the main results, our strategy is to start with a simple New Keynesian framework with capital accumulation and then build it up towards its fully-fledged version, explaining the impact of each extension for the policy prescriptions.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that if credit markets do not work perfectly, strict PPI targeting leads to overexpansion (overcontraction) in economic activity in response to positive (negative) productivity shocks. The related welfare losses are non-negligible, especially if financial imperfections interact with such frictions as nontradable production and wage stickiness. Second, monetary policy should try to offset the effects of balance sheet shocks, thus allowing for deviations from price stability. Third, foreign currency debt denomination affects the optimal monetary policy: it should be less contractionary in response to positive domestic productivity disturbances and more so if productivity shocks originate abroad. Fourth, financial frictions substantially decrease attractiveness not only of PPI targeting, but also of other price targeting regimes. In contrast, they do not have a significant effect on the performance of a monetary union agreement. Fifth, while credit frictions make nominal wage targeting deviate from the optimal policy more than in the perfect financial markets case, it can be considered robust compared to other standard simple policies.
1
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the structure of our model. Section 3 discusses its calibration. The welfare-based framework for evaluating alternative policies is presented in section 4. Section 5 discusses our main results. Section 6 concludes.
Structure of the model
There are two countries in the world: Home (H) and Foreign (F ). Each country is inhabited by a continuum of infinite-lived households, who consume a homogeneous consumption good and supply labour to a continuum of firms. A perfectly competitive sector of capital producers combines the existing capital with investment flows to produce the installed capital stock. Capital is managed and rented to firms by a continuum of entrepreneurs, who use their net worth and a bank loan to finance the capital expenditures. Productivity of each entrepreneur is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, not observed by the bank. This creates agency problems and so interest charged by the banking sector is subject to a premium over the risk-free rate paid by banks on households' deposits.
There are two types of firms in each economy, each using capital and labour as inputs. Nontradable goods producers sell their output only domestically, while tradable goods firms produce both for the local market and for exports. Prices are denominated in the producer currency and set in a monopolistically competitive fashion. Nontradable and tradable goods produced at home are combined with goods imported from abroad into final consumption and investment goods in a perfectly competitive environment.
Fiscal authorities finance their expenditures on nontradable goods by collecting lump sum taxes from the households.
Since the general setup of the Foreign country is similar to that for the Home economy, in the following and more detailed exposition we focus on the latter. To the extent needed, variables and parameters referring to foreign agents are marked with an asterisk. Unless stated otherwise, all variables in the derivations below are expressed in per capita terms. Whenever aggregation across countries is needed, we make use of the normalization of the world population to one, so that the size of Home is n and that of Foreign is 1 − n.
Households
Households in a given country are assumed to be homogenous, i.e. they have the same preferences and endowments. Each household has access to complete markets for state-contingent claims, traded domestically and providing insurance against individual (but not aggregate) income risk. This implies that any idiosyncratic shocks among the households do not result in heterogeneity of their behaviour. Hence, we can focus on the optimization problem of a representative household.
A typical household maximizes the following lifetime utility function:
where E t is the expectation operator conditional on information available at time t, β is the discount rate, σ is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, κ is the weight of leasure in utility and ϕ denotes the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. The instantaneous utility is thus a function of a consumption bundle C t , to be defined below, and labour effort L t . The utility is also affected by a consumption preference shock ε d,t , common to all households in a given country.
The maximization of (1) is subject to a sequence of intertemporal budget constraints of the form:
where P C,t is the price of the consumption bundle C t , W t is the nominal wage rate, R K,t denotes households' income from renting a unit of capital K t , Div H,t and Div N,t are dividends from tradable and nontradable goods producers, respectively, T t stands for lump sum government transfers net of lump sum taxes and T R E,t denotes wealth received from exiting (net of transfers to surviving and entering) entrepreneurs. Households hold their financial wealth in form of bank deposits D t , paying the risk-free (gross) rate R t . As in Chari et al. (2002) , we assume complete markets for state-contingent claims. This means that households have also access to state-contingent bonds B t , paying the expected gross rate of return R t .
Consumption choice
The first order conditions to the representative consumer maximization problem imply the following conventional stochastic Euler equation:
where Π C,t denotes consumer price index (CPI) inflation, expressed in gross terms, and λ C,t is the marginal utility of consumption, defined as:
The consumption bundle C t consists of final tradable goods C T,t and nontradable goods C N,t , aggregated according to:
where γ c is the share of tradable goods in total consumption. The index of tradable goods is defined by:
where C H,t is the bundle of home-made tradable goods consumed at home, C F,t is the bundle of foreignmade tradable goods consumed at home and α denotes the share of home goods in the home basket of tradable goods.
The indices of nontradable and both types of tradable goods are in turn given by the following aggregators of individual varieties:
where φ N , φ H , and φ F are the elasticities of substitution across varieties of a given type. The sequence of intratemporal optimization problems implies the following demand functions for each variety of goods:
where P t (z j ) is the price of variety z j , while the composite price indexes are defined as follows:
Wage setting
Each household j supplies monopolistically one distinctive type of labour L t (j), which is aggregated with labour services of other households in a given country into a homogenous labour input according to the formula:
We follow Erceg et al. (2000) and assume that only a fraction 1 − θ W of households can renegotiate their wage contracts in each period, while wages of the remaining households are indexed to the steady-state CPI inflation.
Households that are allowed to reset their wages take into account that they may not be allowed to do so for some time, so they solve the following maximization problem:
subject to the sequence of labour demand constraints:
where the aggregate wage index is given by:
The first-order condition associated with the optimization problem (19) can be written as:
where M RS t is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour defined as:
Since all households that can renegotiate their wage contracts face an identical optimization problem, they set the same optimal wageW t , which allows us to rewrite the first-order condition (22) in a recursive way as:
where the auxiliary state variables Φ W,t and Ψ W,t are defined as:
Given the wage setting scheme described above, the aggregate wage index evolves according to the following formula:
Capital producers
There is a continuum of perfectly competitive capital producers, owned by the households. At the end of each period, they buy capital from entrepreneurs and combine it with investment goods to produce new installed capital, which is then sold to entrepreneurs.
Consistently with the market clearing on the capital market, the total amount of capital purchased by capital producers must be equal to total undepreciated capital stock in the economy. The economy-wide capital available for production K t+1 evolves then according to the formula:
where I t is investment and τ is the depreciation rate. As in Christiano et al. (2005) , capital accumulation is subject to investment-specific technological progress ε i,t and adjustment cost represented by a function Γ I,t , defined as:
The optimization problem of a representative capital producer is to maximize the present discounted value of future profits:
where P I,t is the price of investment goods I t and Q T,t is the real price of installed capital (Tobin's Q). The first order condition to this optimization problem yields the following investment demand equation:
The final investment good is produced in a similar fashion as the final consumption good, which implies the following definitions:
Hence, while we allow for differences in the tradable-nontradable composition between the final consumption basket and the investment basket (i.e. γ c need not be equal to γ i ), we assume for simplicity that the structure of the purely tradable component is identical for both types of goods.
Entrepreneurs and banks
Capital services to firms are supplied by a continuum of risk-neutral entrepreneurs, indexed by z E . At the end of period t, each entrepreneur purchases installed capital K t+1 (z E ) from capital producers, partly using its own financial wealth N t+1 (z E ) and financing the remainder by a bank loan B E,t+1 (z E ):
After the purchase, each entrepreneur experiences an idiosyncratic productivity shock, which converts its capital to a E (z E )K t+1 (z E ), where a E is a random variable, distributed independently over time and across entrepreneurs, with a cumulative density function F (a E ) and a unit mean. Following Christiano et al. (2003) , we assume that this distribution is log normal, with a time-varying standard deviation of log a E equal to ε e,t σ E , known to entrepreneurs before their capital decisions.
Next, each entrepreneur rents out capital services, treating the rental rate R K,t+1 as given. Since the mean of an idiosyncratic shock is equal to one, the average rate of return on capital earned by entrepreneurs can be written as:
and the rate of return earned by an individual entrepreneur is a E (z E )R E,t+1 . Idiosyncratic shocks are observed by entrepreneurs but not by banks, so lending involves agency costs, reflected in a debt contract between these two parties. The contract specifies the size of the loan B E,t+1 (z E ) and the gross non-default interest rate R B,t+1 (z E ) charged by the bank. The solvency criterion can also be defined in terms of a cutoff value of idiosyncratic productivity, denoted asã E,t+1 (z E ), such that the entrepreneur has just enough resources to repay the loan:
Entrepreneurs with a E below the threshold level go bankrupt. Their all resources are taken over by the banks, after they pay proportional and nontradable monitoring costs µ.
Banks finance their loans by issuing time deposits to households at the risk-free interest rate R t . The banking sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive and owned by risk-averse households. This together with risk-neutrality of entrepreneurs implies a financial contract insulating the lender from any aggregate risk.
3 Hence, interest paid on a bank loan by entrepreneurs is state contingent and guarantees that banks break even in every period. The aggregate zero profit condition for the banking sector can be written as:
or equivalently (using (37)):
where
and the analytical formulas for F 1,t and F 2,t , making use of the log-normal assumption for F (a E ), are given in the appendix.
The equilibrium debt contract maximizes welfare of each individual entrepreneur. We define it in terms of expected end-of-contract net worth relative to the risk-free alternative, which is holding a domestic bond:
The first-order condition to this optimization problem can be written as:
As can be seen from (43), the ex ante external financing premium, defined as E t R E,t+1 −R t , arises because of monitoring costs. If µ is set to zero, the expected rate of return on capital is equal to the risk-free interest rate and so the financial markets are perfect.
Equation (43), together with the bank zero profit constraint (39), defines the optimal debt contract in terms of the cutoff value of the idiosyncratic shockã E,t+1 and the leverage ratio t , defined as:
It is easy to verify that these two contract parameters are identical across entrepreneurs. There are two important implications of this result, facilitating aggregation. First, the loan amount taken by each entrepreneur is proportional to his net worth. Second, the rate of interest paid to the bank is the same for each non-defaulting entrepreneur:
We will refer to the difference between this rate and the risk-free rate R t as the credit spread. Proceeds from selling capital, net of interest paid to the bank, constitute end of period net worth. To capture the phenomenon of ongoing entries and exits of firms and to ensure that entrepreneurs do not accumulate enough wealth to become fully self-financing, we assume that each period a randomly selected and time-varying fraction 1 − ε ν,t υ of them go out of business, in which case all their financial wealth is rebated to the households. At the same time, an equal number of new entrepreneurs enters, so that the total number of entrepreneurs is constant. Those who survive and enter receive a transfer T E,t from the households. This ensures that both entrants and surviving bankrupt entrepreneurs have at least a small but positive amount of wealth, without which they would not be able to buy any capital.
Aggregating across all entrepreneurs and using (39) yields the following law of motion for net worth in the economy:
The term in the square brackets represents the total revenue from renting and selling capital net of interest paid on bank loans, averaged over both bankrupt and non-bankrupt entrepreneurs.
While discussing our results, we also consider a situation in which bank loans taken by entrepreneurs in the home country are denominated in foreign rather than domestic currency. The modifications needed to implement this variant are presented in the appendix.
Firms

Production technology
There exist a continuum of identically monopolistic competitive firms in each of the nontradable and tradable sectors, owned by households and indexed by z N and z H , respectively. The production technology is homogenous with respect to labour and capital inputs:
where η N and η H are sector-specific output elasticities with respect to capital input, while ε n,t and ε t,t are sector-specific productivity parameters. The output indexes are given by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators:
Since all firms in a given sector operate technologies with the same relative intensity of productive factors and face the same prices for labour and capital inputs (factor markets are homogeneous), cost minimization implies the following sector-specific capital-labour relationships:
Price setting
Firms producing nontradable goods set their prices according to the Calvo (1983) staggering mechanism. Only a fraction 1 − θ N of them set their prices in a forward-looking manner, while the prices of firms that do not receive a price signal are fully indexed to the steady-state inflation in the nontradable sectorΠ N . Firms that are allowed to reoptimize realize that they may not be allowed to do so for some time, hence their price-setting problem is to maximize the expected present discounted value of future profits:
subject to the sequence of demand constraints:
where M C N,t is the real marginal cost (identical across nontradable goods firms) defined as:
The first-order condition associated with the profit-maximization problem faced by reoptimizing firms can be written as:
There are no firm-specific shocks in the model, so all firms that are allowed to reset their price in a forwardlooking manner select the same optimal priceP N,t , which implies the following recursive representation of the first-order condition (55):P
The expression for the evolution of the home nontradable goods price index can be written as follows:
The price-setting problem solved by firms producing tradable goods is similar and leads to first-order conditions and price indices analogous to equation (55) and (59), respectively. We assume that prices are set in the producer currency and that the international law of one price holds for each tradable variety. Therefore, the price of home goods sold abroad and that of foreign goods sold domestically are given by:
where ER t is the nominal exchange rate expressed as units of domestic currency per one unit of foreign currency.
Exchange rate dynamics
The perfect risk sharing condition implies (see Chari et al., 2002) :
where Q t is the real exchange rate defined as:
The real exchange rate is allowed to deviate from the purchasing power parity (PPP) due to changes in relative prices of tradable vs. nontradable goods in both countries (the internal exchange rates) and changes in terms-of-trade, as long as there is some home bias in preferences (α = α * ). This can be demonstrated using the price indices derived above and the law of one price conditions for tradable goods:
where the terms-of-trade S t is defined as home import prices relative to home export prices:
and the internal exchange rates X t and X * t are defined as:
Monetary and fiscal authorities
We consider several variants of monetary policy regimes, including the Ramsey optimal policy. For calibration, we assume that the monetary authority responds to the economic conditions through the following interestrate feedback rule:
where Y t is total output,Ȳ is its steady state level,R is the steady state interest rate and ε m,t is a monetary policy shock.
The fiscal authority is modelled in a very simplistic fashion: government expenditures and transfers to the households are fully financed by lump sum taxes, so that the state budget is balanced each period. The government spending is fully directed at nontradable goods and is modelled as a stochastic process ε g,t . Given our representative agent assumption, Ricardian equivalence holds in the model.
Market clearing conditions
Goods markets
The model is closed by imposing the following market clearing conditions. Output of each firm producing non-tradable goods is either consumed domestically, spent on investment, purchased by the government or used by banks to cover monitoring costs. Similarly, all tradable goods are consumed or invested domestically or abroad. Using these conditions, the demand functions (10), (11) and (12) together with their analogs for investment and government goods, the output indexes given by (49) and (50), and taking into account the size of both countries, one can write the aggregate output in the two sectors at home as:
Total output Y t is the sum of output produced in the nontradable and tradable sectors:
or in nominal terms:
where P t is the implicit total output deflator, which we will refer to as the producer price index (PPI).
Factor markets
Equilibrium in factor markets requires:
which can be rewritten using (47), (48), (51) and the demand sequences like in (53) as:
where ∆ N,t and ∆ H,t are the measures of price dispersion in the nontradable and tradable sector:
The following laws of motion for the two dispersion indexes can be derived using (59):
Financial markets
Finally, in equilibrium, household deposits at banks must be equal to total funds lent to entrepreneurs:
Exogenous shocks
There are eight stochastic disturbances hitting each economy. These concern: productivity in the tradable sector, productivity in the nontradable sector, consumption preferences, government spending, investmentspecific technology, survival of entrepreneurs, idiosyncratic riskiness and the monetary policy. The log of each shock follows a linear first-order autoregressive process, except for the monetary policy shock, which is assumed to be white noise.
Calibration
We calibrate our model to the euro area economy, setting its size in our two-country world to 0.25. The parameters for the rest of the world are assumed to be identical to those in the euro area. Our calibration proceeds in two steps. We first match the key steady-state ratios of the euro area and set the other structural parameters so that they are consistent with the estimated version of the New Area-Wide Model (NAWM), documented in Christoffel et al. (2008) . While parameterizing the financial frictions block, we draw on Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christiano et al. (2007) . In the next step, the inertia and volatility of stochastic disturbances are chosen to match the moments of a standard set of euro area macroaggregates, augmented by two financial variables. These are the debt of the enterprise sector and the spread between interest charged on loans to firms and the short-term yield on government bonds. The results of the calibration exercise are reported in Tables 1 to 4 and the resulting variance decomposition is shown in Table 5 . Tables 1 to 5 about here Our model replicates the standard deviations of GDP and its main components. It significantly underestimates the volatility of the short-term interest rate and roughly captures that of inflation. As regards our two financial variables, there is some trade-off in matching the standard deviation of entrepreneurs' debt and that of credit spreads. In principle, a better fit could be obtained by increasing the volatility of the survival shock at the expense of the riskiness shock, but would require significant deviations from the econometric estimates obtained by Christiano et al. (2007) .
Turning to other moment matching results, our model gets persistence and cyclical behaviour of most of the variables of interest more or less right, although the fit for investment can be seen as disappointing, given the model's focus on frictions in financing capital expenditures. It is also worth noting that while our model makes the premium less countercyclical than in the data, it somewhat exaggerates its negative correlation with investment. Clearly, a better fit in this dimension would require allowing for financial frictions also in the household sector.
Welfare-based evaluation of alternative policies
In our framework, a natural welfare criterion is the discounted sum of expected utility flows given by (1), averaged over all households:
Using a general form of labour demand sequences (20), our welfare criterion can be rewritten in a recursive form:
where the wage dispersion index ∆ W,t is defined as:
and (using (27)) subject to the following law of motion:
It is clear from (80) that in our model welfare depends positively on the level of consumption and negatively on wage and price dispersion, with the latter relationship following from the market clearing condition for the aggregate labour input (73).
We define the optimal policy in our model as the Ramsey cooperative equilibrium, in which both central banks implement policies that maximize the weighted average of welfare (as defined above) of the two regions, with the weights given by the population size.
4 As in Woodford (2003), we consider policies under commitment in a timeless perspective. Under these restrictions, our benchmark generates the best possible allocation in our two-region world. In principle, there is no guarantee that this policy maximizes welfare of a representative consumer in each region. Coenen et al. (2008) show that the Nash equilibrium, in which each central bank maximizes welfare of its own country taking as given the other central bank's action, might yield higher welfare from an individual country's perspective so that the gains from cooperation are negative. We leave this more complex 5 analysis of non-cooperative policies for future research and will refer henceforth to the cooperative equilibrium as optimal.
In order to build intuition for the optimal policy outcomes, we compare them to those obtained under simple policy variants. These include various forms of strict inflation targeting and, following the findings in Levin et al. (2005) , nominal wage targeting. We also consider the case of a full monetary integration, defined as the same cooperative equilibrium of the benchmark case, except that the exchange rate between the two regions is fixed.
We assess the welfare implications of the alternative monetary policy strategies by taking a second-order approximation of all model equations, including the first-order conditions of the welfare maximization problem of the policy maker.
6 Such a numerical approach yields a correct ranking of alternative policies and has been used in many analyses of optimal policy (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2006; Coenen et al., 2008) .
7
We evaluate each policy by calculating the welfare loss, expressed in terms of the proportion of each period's consumption that the typical household in the home economy would need to give up in a deterministic 4 The first order conditions of the welfare maximization problem of the policy maker(s) are computed using G. Lombardo's lq solution routine, downloadable from http://home.arcor.de/calomba.
5 As it is well known, the Nash equilibrium depends on the choice of instrument defining the policy game and the concept of equilibrium (open loop vs. closed loop).
6 The calculations are performed in Dynare 4, which can be downloaded from http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare. 7 An alternative would be to use a linear-quadratic approximation described in Benigno and Woodford (2005) , which is a generalization to Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) . As discussed by Benigno and Woodford (2006) , a clear advantage of this analytical approach is that it helps to gain insight into fully optimal policy. However, given the size and complexity of our model, following this way seems to be of little use, so we opt for a more practical and less time-consuming method.
world so that its welfare is equal to the expected conditional utility in the stochastic world. More precisely, we calculate Ω that satisfies the following equation:
where variables without time subscripts denote their respective steady state values and the starting point for the left hand side of (83) is the ergodic mean of the cooperative equilibrium.
Results
Optimal policy in a simple model with capital accumulation
Our main objective is to demonstrate how the presence of financial frictions changes the optimal policy response. To make the exposition more transparent and comparable to the previous literature, we first consider a simplified version of our model and then build it up, explaining the policy implications of each addition. More specifically, our departure point is a perfectly symmetric two-country world with the following features: perfect financial markets, flexible wages, only tradable goods, no home bias and no government purchases. This special case can be easily obtained from the full specification described in section 2 by setting a subset of parameters to appropriate values. In other words, we consider a standard two-country New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and analyze how adding to it financial frictions changes the optimal monetary policy.
Before we move on to the results, one remark is in order. Remember that we calibrate all parameters (and shock volatilities in particular) using the fully-fledged version of our model. This means that its simple variants do not necessarily retain a solid empirical basis if the parameters are kept unchanged. Therefore, in order to facilitate comparisons, we normalize all welfare losses presented below by the ratio of output variance in a given version (under the Taylor rule) to output variance in the full version of our model. Table 6 present the welfare losses (relative to the optimal cooperative policy) of a set of simple policies in our benchmark model with perfect or imperfect financial markets. It is well known (see e.g. a recent review by Engel, 2009 ) that in the standard open economy New Keynesian model with producer currency pricing, PPI targeting replicates the optimal policy outcomes. As can be seen from Table 6 , this is also the case in the model with endogenous capital accumulation.
9 The losses associated with keeping consumer prices or the exchange rate stable are non-negligible but do not exceed 0.08% of steady-state consumption, while the Taylor rule performs worst. These losses are almost entirely due to technology disturbances, while the contribution of other shocks (preference and investment-specific in this simple model version) is very close to zero. Table 6 about here If financial markets are imperfect, PPI targeting is no longer optimal. The welfare loss associated with this policy amounts to less than 0.05% of steady-state consumption. This number may appear rather small. However, as Table 7 reveals, the consequences of introducing financial frictions turn out to be an order of magnitude larger than those related to home bias, habits, nontradable goods or government expenditures. One can also note that the presence of financial frictions makes the monetary union or the Taylor rule relatively more attractive, while the opposite holds true for CPI targeting. Table 7 about here 8 This is motivated by the fact that welfare losses are approximately proportional to the variance of stochastic disturbances. Therefore, our normalization can be thought of as a proportional correction of all shock volatilities so that the standard deviation of output in a given model version matches that observed in the data.
9 As demonstrated by Edge (2003) , the utility-based loss function of a policy maker in a standard New Keynesian model is modified if one allows for endogenous capital accumulation. Our estimates show that the effects of this modification for optimal policy prescriptions can be ignored in practice.
In order to gain insight into an optimal monetary policy conduct when financial markets are imperfect, we compare the impulse responses under the cooperative regime to those implied by PPI targeting. Figure  1 depicts the dynamic responses to a positive productivity shock in the home economy. If both central banks target domestic producer prices, the shock is clearly expansionary, although there is a short-lived contraction in foreign economy's output. Since entrepreneurs' balance sheets improve, the external finance premium goes down, which leads to an acceleration of investment. No home bias in preferences implies that the real exchange rate is constant (see equation (63)), so real interest rates in both countries must respond symmetrically. However, nominal rates at home fall more than abroad, so the exchange rate depreciates.
Under the optimal cooperative regime, there is also an expansion in the economic activity, but it is more moderate, especially on impact. To achieve this, both central banks actually tighten their policy before letting the short-term real interest rates follow closely the path of PPI targeting. As a result, the decline in the external financing premium of the home country is more than halved and its response abroad is even slightly positive. The reason why the optimal policy attempts to dampen the movements in the risk premium is that they act as a distortionary tax on investment, the excessive fluctuations of which are inefficient. In other words, the policy maker faces a trade-off between the costs of price dispersion and inefficiencies related to movements in the financing premium. It is also worth noting that the optimal policy delivers smaller responses of the exchange rate and consumer price inflation in both countries.
Figure 1 about here
As in the frictionless case, the welfare implications of other shocks (preference and investment-specific shocks, as well as two shocks related to entrepreneurs, i.e. survival rate and riskiness) lumped together are an order of magnitude smaller than those of productivity shocks. It is interesting to note, however, that in this case the fixed exchange rate regime performs better than strict PPI targeting. This observation applies for any of these shocks considered individually.
We take a closer look at a negative survival rate shock. This shock can be interpreted as an exogenous destruction in entrepreneurs' net worth, which decreases their ability to borrow. While its welfare implications are not large under our calibration, they may become very significant at times like those observed in the recent financial turmoil. The dynamic responses are shown in Figure 2 . By raising the external financing premium, this shock acts like a cost-push shock, so keeping prices stable requires tightening of the monetary policy. The optimal response tries to strike a balance between the negative effects of price dispersion and an inefficient rise in the external financing premium. As a result, central banks try to offset net worth destruction resulting from the shock with an initial easing of the monetary policy, which allows to dampen the response in the premium at the expense of a rise in inflation and large swings in the nominal exchange rate. If both countries agree to fix their exchange rate, they come closer to the optimum than under PPI targeting. The reason is that the union case allows for some increase in inflation and a short-run expansion, which helps to limit an increase in the premium. In their model, optimal policy is expansionary in response to a negative net worth shock in terms of cumulative real rates, but they actually increase on impact only to decline below levels implied by price stability, so the initial rise of the risk premium is higher under optimal policy. This results in a rather unintuitive conclusion that introducing risk premia will lead the central bank to magnify their movements compared to the strict inflation targeting regime. The authors conjecture that a more elaborate model, featuring demand-side effects via endogenous capital accumulation, is going to preserve this result. In contrast, our model implies that the initial response of optimizing policy makers to net worth destruction will be easing on impact, which we consider more realistic.
Debt denomination
In the simple model considered so far, the two economies were perfectly symmetric. In this section we revisit the case when one of the country's entrepreneurial debt is denominated in the other country's currency. We will refer to this case as debt euroization and contrast its welfare implications with the baseline variant, i.e. domestic currency debt denomination. The results are reported in Table 8 , which splits the shocks by their origin. Table 8 about here The most striking result is that if domestic entrepreneurs' debt is denominated in the foreign currency, PPI targeting nearly replicates the optimal response to home productivity shocks, while the other regimes somewhat lose in attractiveness. In contrast, strict producer price inflation stability performs significantly worse than CPI targeting, and even more so compared to the union case, if productivity shocks originate abroad. On balance, if productivity volatility is equal in both economies, the welfare ranking of alternative regimes remains intact compared to the non-euroized case. However, if productivity shocks abroad are on average sufficiently larger than at home, then the euroized economy may find itself better-off having the exchange rate fixed.
The intuition for this result is as follows. We have seen in our baseline variant that a positive productivity shock at home leads to an expansion in economic activity and depreciation of the exchange rate, both under the optimal policy and PPI targeting. If entrepreneurs' debt is denominated in the foreign currency, however, the depreciation has also an adverse effect on their balance sheets, which cools down the boom. This is confirmed by the impulse responses presented in Figure 3 . Comparing them to those shown in Figure 1 for the case of domestic currency debt denomination reveals that the drop in the external financing premium is now substantially smaller. Interestingly, this exchange rate related additional balance sheet channel implies that the optimal policy no longer tightens on impact but rather lets the real interest rates fall, like under PPI targeting. By construct, this channel does not operate if the exchange rate is fixed, so the responses for the union case in the euroized and non-euroized cases are the same. Since keeping the exchange rate constant requires initial tightening, the responses under this regime are now further away from the optimum. An analogous reasoning can be used to see why PPI targeting deviates more from the optimal policy if entrepreneurs' debt is denominated in the foreign currency and productivity shocks originate abroad. Since in this case the exchange rate appreciates, the balance sheets of entrepreneurs improve and so the economic expansion at home is magnified. Therefore, as can be seen from Figure 4 , the optimal policy now tightens much more on impact and so moves further away from the easing policy required to stabilize PPI inflation. With our parametrization, this effect is strong enough to make the fixed exchange rate a relatively more attractive option.
Figure 4 about here
More generally, the policy ranking obtained in the euroized case for foreign productivity shocks depends on the extent of financial market imperfections and the size of leverage. If financial frictions are substantial and entrepreneurs run sufficiently high debt denominated in the foreign currency, the balance sheet effects related to exchange rate movements will be important and the fixed exchange rate regime will yield higher welfare than PPI targeting. If on the other hand financial markets are close to perfect and leverage small, stabilizing PPI inflation will be preferred. More detailed experiments reveal that our model parametrization is quite close to this threshold: if about 55% or more of capital purchased by entrepreneurs is financed by their net worth (compared to 50% in our baseline calibration), the welfare ranking of policies is the same as in the non-euroized case. 
Nontradable production
We next relax the assumption that all goods are tradable and consider a more general version of our model, with the share of nontradable inputs in consumption and investment as in our baseline parametrization. The welfare losses of alternative monetary regimes are reported in Table 9 .
Our findings for a model with perfect capital markets are consistent with the previous literature. In particular, PPI targeting no longer replicates the optimal policy, even though the losses are very small in practice.
11 Also, in line with Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) , the presence of nontradable goods clearly strengthens the case for exchange rate flexibility.
Adding financial frictions makes the losses from PPI targeting non-negligible. This effect is substantially stronger than in a model where all goods are tradable. As before, the monetary union somewhat gains relative to other regimes, but this time, at least under our parametrization, falls short of CPI targeting.
Taking a closer look at the decomposition of welfare losses by shocks when entrepreneurs' debt is denominated in the domestic currency, at least one observation warrants a comment. Contrary to the model without nontradables, PPI targeting performs slightly worse than CPI targeting and substantially worse than the monetary union in response to productivity shocks originating in the domestic tradable sector. However, in this very case it is actually targeting PPI inflation in the nontradable sector that comes closest to the optimal policy. Table 9 about here In order to shed some light on why the policy ranking changes if we allow for nontradable production, we use the impulse response analysis. Figure 5 shows the dynamic responses to a home tradable sector productivity shock under various regimes. The outcomes under optimal policy are qualitatively very similar to those obtained in the fully tradable version of our model presented in Figure 1 . Compared to strict PPI targeting, the optimal cooperative policy tries to dampen the boom fuelled by the financial accelerator mechanism. Importantly, however, the difference between these two policies is now more pronounced in relative terms. In particular, the optimal policy designs nearly twice lower depreciation and a three times lower decrease in the external finance premium. The reason why PPI targeting overexpands relatively more than we have seen in our simple model is that the presence of the nontradable sector makes stabilizing the overall producer inflation more difficult. This is because nontradable goods prices are less flexible, which follows from our calibration (see Table 1 ), but also from the fact that they are insulated from direct effects of exchange rate movements.
12 As a result, keeping PPI constant now requires more policy easing (in relative terms, i.e. after correcting for the fact that an increase in productivity affects only one sector of the economy), the side effect of which is an excessive decrease in external financing premium.
If the exchange rate is pegged, the effect of the financial accelerator is nearly eliminated and so the economic expansion is dampened too much. However, the deviations from the optimal policy turn out to be smaller than in the PPI targeting case, hence the union case ranks better. Targeting nontradable goods prices comes closest to optimal and so outperforms all other simple regimes. It completely eliminates price dispersion in the nontradable sector and lets the average level of producer prices drop. Hence, it does not require as much easing as PPI targeting and so leads to a boom that is only slightly excessive.
Figure 5 about here Naturally, the ranking of regimes established for a model without nontradables remains valid in the model with nontradable production as long as the share of the latter in output is sufficiently small. As our experiments show, however, the union case dominates PPI targeting in response to foreign tradable productivity shocks already when the share of nontradables is around 10%, so our finding about the change in the policy ranking can be treated as robust.
If both some goods are nontradable and domestic entrepreneurs' debt is denominated in the foreign currency, our results are qualitatively similar to those obtained for the fully tradable and euroized case presented in Table 8 . In particular, PPI targeting performs closest to optimal in response to domestic tradable sector productivity shocks. This means that, under our parameterization, the presence of nontradables is not enough to offset the stabilizing effect of euroized liabilities discussed in the previous section. In principle, this result depends on the size of the nontradable sector. We find, however, that the fixed exchange rate regime yields higher welfare than PPI targeting in response to domestic tradable sector productivity disturbances in a euroized economy only if the share of nontradable production in total output is at least 80%, which is more than observed in the data (see Lombardo and Ravenna, 2009) .
Finally, we note that, as before, if shocks originate in the tradable sector abroad, PPI targeting performs worse than CPI targeting and the union. However, these two rules are beaten by nontradable goods inflation stabilization. More generally, while targeting nontradable sector prices seems to be an attractive alternative to stabilizing the weighted average of inflation in both sectors whenever the latter policy performs worse than the union case, it is not so in general. Taking all shocks into account, targeting PPI in the nontradable sector is inferior to total PPI targeting.
The role of wage stickiness
As the last step in our analysis, we extend the models discussed in the previous section for sticky wages. The welfare losses of alternative monetary regimes are reported in Table 10 .
In line with the studies using a simpler closed economy setup (see e.g. Erceg et al., 2000; Benigno and Woodford, 2004) , we find that adding wage stickiness to the frictionless version of our model makes strict inflation stabilization policies clearly suboptimal. A particularly strong increase in welfare losses can be observed for both variants of PPI targeting, which become inferior to CPI stabilization. On the contrary, the performance of the fixed exchange rate and Taylor rules hardly change compared to the flexible wages case. Both of these policies clearly dominate any of the price targeting regimes. Consistently with the results obtained by Levine et al. (2005) , the best performer is now nominal wage targeting.
When we relax the assumption on perfect financial markets, these findings become even more pronounced. The welfare losses related to any of the three strict price stabilization policies increase by a factor of two or more and can be considered very substantial. This can be contrasted with a very moderate change in the performance of the monetary union and Taylor rules, particularly if entrepreneurs' debt is denominated in the foreign currency. Finally, even though the size of welfare losses associated with wage inflation targeting increases by a factor of three or four, this policy remains superior to any of the alternatives considered. Table 10 about here As before, we build intuition for our results by looking at how different shocks contribute to the welfare losses discussed above, starting first with domestic currency debt denomination. It is clear from Table 10 that the large welfare losses of price stabilization strategies are mainly due to productivity shocks, while the relative decrease in performance of the remaining regimes can be mainly, or in some cases even exclusively, attributed to other shocks. We illustrate these results in Figures 6 to 10 , plotting the impulse responses to the main shocks of interest.
We have seen in the previous sections that strict PPI targeting required monetary policy easing that was too excessive. Looking at Figure 6 , showing the responses to a tradable sector productivity shock at home, it is clear that now this effect is much stronger. This is because if wages are sticky, their contribution to mitigate deflationary pressures caused by an increase in productivity is reduced for a given interest rate path. Therefore, the monetary expansion needed to keep PPI inflation unchanged is bigger and the resulting boom magnified by the financial accelerator. At the same time, fluctuations in nominal wages are now undesired from the welfare perspective. This means that the optimal policy has an incentive to reduce them, so it is actually more restrictive on impact compared to the model with flexible wages. As a result, PPI targeting and the cooperative equilibrium deviate from each other more than before. Similar mechanisms deteriorate the performance of CPI stabilization. This regime, however, is now superior to PPI targeting as it allows for a fall in producer prices and so does not require so much monetary expansion. The remaining policies imply significantly more moderate wage adjustment, hence the outcomes they yield do not differ that much from those obtained under flexible wages. In particular, the dampening of economic expansion obtained with the wage targeting regime turns out to be close to that designed by the optimal policy. Figure 6 about here Considerations analogous to those described above also help to understand the weak performance of price stabilization regimes in response to home nontradable sector shocks (see Figure 7 ). This time, however, it is nontradable sector inflation stabilization that leads to largest welfare losses as it requires very strong policy easing to offset deflationary pressures in this sector. If productivity shocks originate abroad, producer price stabilization policies in the home economy do not require so much monetary expansion. However, the strong appreciation pressure caused by a large decrease in interest rates abroad implies the need for excessive policy easing at home as well (see Figure 8 and 9) . Therefore, similarly to what we have seen for the shocks of a domestic origin, overall PPI targeting does badly in response to tradable productivity shocks in the foreign economy, while nontradable PPI targeting generates large welfare losses in response to foreign nontradable sector shocks. Contrary to producer price stabilization, the relative attractiveness of CPI targeting declines significantly if productivity shocks come from abroad. This is because, given deflationary pressures from the foreign economy, inflation needs to be generated in domestic sectors to keep the price of a home consumption basket stable, which implies monetary easing and an inefficiently large drop in the risk premium. We note that while wage targeting outperforms all other simple regimes in response to productivity shocks when wages are sticky and financial markets are imperfect, it is not always the case for other shocks. In particular, fixing the exchange rate turns out to be a better option in response to a destruction in net worth. Even though the implications of this disturbance for welfare evaluation are very small compared to productivity shocks, it might be instructive to examine the impulse responses to this shock under different regimes, which we plot in Figure 10 . Similarly to a model with flexible wages and no nontradable production (see Figure 2 ), the optimal policy is expansionary following an unexpected decrease in net worth. A qualitatively similar response is also possible if the exchange rate is fixed. In contrast, due to a cost-push nature of the shock, a tightening is required to keep nominal wages (and even more so prices) constant. The most significant observation that can be taken from Table 10 is that debt euroization makes the two PPI targeting regimes deviate less (more) from the optimal policy if productivity shocks originate at home (abroad). This result can be understood by looking at the exchange rate movements presented for the noneuroized case, using the intuition we have built for the simple model with flexible wages and tradable goods only. It is clear from Figures 6 to 9 that PPI stabilization policies lead to depreciation of the exchange rate for domestic productivity shocks, helping to dampen the boom and inefficient movements in the external financing premia through an adverse effect on entrepreneurs' balance sheets, while the opposite holds true for shocks coming from abroad.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed and quantified how frictions in financing capital expenditures affect the optimal monetary policy conduct in a two-country DSGE setup. Consistently with the earlier literature using more simple and closed-economy models, we find that financial market imperfections generate a trade-off between inflation and external financing premium stabilization, making strict inflation targeting suboptimal. We show, however, that the welfare implications of this trade-off are non-negligible. In particular, financial frictions substantially magnify the incentives to deviate from price stability created by such frictions if we allow for nontradable goods and wage stickiness.
In contrast, financial market imperfections considered in our paper do not have a significant effect on the performance of the monetary union. This means that the presence of financial frictions strengthens the case for such an arrangement if cooperation between countries under flexible exchange rate regimes is difficult to implement.
There is a number of potentially fruitful future research directions, of which we will name only two. First, it might be interesting to revisit the literature on international monetary policy cooperation. According to our preliminary (and not reported) calculations, gains from cooperation after introducing financial frictions remain small, especially if mark-up shocks are absent. However, this may change if one allows for international financial market integration, where firm balance sheets depend on foreign assets, as in Dedola and Lombardo (2009) . Second, some of the issues addressed in our paper, like debt euroization and monetary integration, may be particularly relevant for small open economies. A realistic investigation of such cases would call for an asymmetric setup, especially while constructing monetary policy games. We leave these interesting extensions for future research. Notes: GDP components and entrepreneurs' debt are expressed in log differences. Notes: GDP components and entrepreneurs' debt are expressed in log differences. Note: The financing premium, inflation and the interest rate are expressed as percentage point deviations from their steady-state levels. All remaining variables are reported as percentage deviations.
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